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Abstract   This paper analyzes how government action in Chilean fisheries has
evolved over the last five decades, explaining why it followed the course it did.
Weaknesses in the enforcement of access restrictions and recommended catch
quotas are discussed. An in-depth study of the late 1980s reform of Chilean fish-
eries law allows us to discuss the relevance of information problems,
distributional conflicts, and lobbying pressures from organized interest groups,
when attempts are made to enforce more stringent quota policies. The legisla-
tion resulting from the late 1980s reform process is consistent with regulatory
capture effects. Overall, this paper adds evidence about the reasons for a pro-
longed persistence of inefficient institutional arrangements at marine industrial
fisheries, in spite of increasingly scarce common-pool resources.
Key words   Chilean fisheries law, common property, marine industrial fisher-
ies, regulation.
Introduction
This paper analyzes how government action in Chilean fisheries has evolved over
the last five decades, explaining why it followed the course it did. A striking feature
of this evolution is the persistent weaknesses in the regulator’s efforts to enforce
more binding access restrictions and proposed catch quota policies. An analysis of these
weaknesses provides intuitions on key problems underlying the frequently cited proposi-
tion of a prolonged persistence of inefficient institutional arrangements at marine indus-
trial fisheries, in spite of increasingly scarce common-pool resources (Eggertsson 1990,
ch. 8). We develop an in-depth case study of the late 1980s reform of Chilean fisheries
law in order to illustrate the relevance of information problems, distributional con-
flicts and lobbying pressures from organized interest groups, when attempts are
made to enforce more stringent quota policies for common-pool fish stocks.
Common property and multifirm harvesting competition tend to produce over-
fishing of scarce fish stocks, unless firms are able to agree on self-government to
control fishing effort. However, incomplete and asymmetric information sets make self-
government an infrequent option in most marine industrial fisheries. In the unusual case
when cooperative self-government is agreed upon (Jentoft 1989), controls normally fo-
cus on admissible technologies and rules governing access and fishing space allocations.
Rules governing the quantity of fish harvested are rarely seen (Schlager 1994). Explana-
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tions for the latter frequently emphasize the stringent information requirements that di-
rect controls on harvesting often entail (Scott 1988, 1993). However, information prob-
lems alone cannot explain the frequent failure to find agreement on government struc-
tures for controlling the collective harvesting of common pool fish stocks. Otherwise, as
Scott (1993) convincingly argues, we should observe, as time goes by, a trend towards
increasing investment in scientific knowledge from fishermen themselves, as this would
presumably allow them to arrive at a more efficient collective cooperative harvesting.
This does not seem to be the case in most marine fisheries. It is certainly not the case in
Chile. The costs for ensuring an exclusive appropriation of the possible resulting ben-
efits is certainly a significant constraint for further private investment of this type.
Nonetheless, more needs to be argued if one aims to explain why governments
themselves often invest in scientific knowledge about fisheries at a rate that is too
slow (Gulland 1989). Distributional issues play a very significant role in this re-
spect. In addition to informational constraints, controls over aggregate harvests face
another significant obstacle: they impose binding limits on the de facto prevailing
user rights over common-pool fish stocks. In most cases, this triggers disputes over
the rules for dividing the distributional burdens that necessarily result from this type
of control. In marine fisheries, the costs for arriving at collective agreement on dis-
tributional burdens are especially acute. This is mainly due to pervasive uncertain-
ties about different aspects of fish stocks, but also because of frequent technological
heterogeneity among rival fishermen. Similar informational problems, and the re-
lated costs for solving distributional conflicts, should be expected to condition gov-
ernments’ choices between catch quota policies, access restrictions, and technology
(effort) controls when deciding how to regulate aggregate harvests.
Legislative innovations aimed at introducing more stringent quota policies are
expected to face opposition from incumbent firms. The results from this process
usually depend, in a fundamental way, on the relative lobbying and bargaining pow-
ers of the main organized interest groups affected by the proposed reforms. These
are intuitions which have been recently analyzed by renewed theories of political
economy, highlighting distributive conflicts and lobbying strategies from organized
interest groups as key factors to understand enacted regulations (e.g., Laffont and
Tirole 1993, p. 537).
In the late 1980s, strong controversies arose on the prevailing regulations for
Chilean fisheries. This was related to the rapid growth of the industrial fishing sec-
tor between the mid 1970s and the late 1980s. The controversies led to a reform of
the Chilean fisheries law, although it took more than three years of discussions to
finally enact the new legislation. A significant innovation attempted to introduce In-
dividual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) to the most important marine fisheries in the
country. But this faced strong opposition from a significant sector of incumbent
firms. As a result, ad hoc restrictions on ITQs were legislated. After five years since
the enactment of the new fisheries law in 1991, ITQs have been used in only two
relatively small fisheries, while the most important industrial fishing grounds remain
under (annually renewable) closed entry regulation and periodic biological closures.
This paper analyzes the evolution of Chilean fishing regulations, focusing on ac-
cess restrictions and recommended catch quotas for the main industrial fishing
grounds. For more than fifty years Chilean marine fisheries were ruled by a doctrine
of historical rights in the issuance of fishing permits. This made possible the en-
forcement of access regulations and controls on fishing technologies, but during this
period the regulators faced persistent impediments in the enforcement of quota poli-
cies. This was particularly evident in the case of pelagic fisheries, historically the
most important Chilean industrial fisheries and where increases in the market share
of long-established firms implied significant industrial concentration, particularly
since the reprivatization reform of the mid 1970s.Chilean Fishing Regulation 255
Table 1
Chilean Fish Catches (1993)
Main Fishing Grounds
Northern Fisheries Southern Fisheries
A B VIII Austral Others Country
Totala 2,015.1 266.8 3,126.2 96.9 285.1 5,790.1
Artisanal 100.4 50.0 262.6 9.5 28.3 450.8
Fish Farming — — — 76.1 1.4 77.5
Industrial 1,914.7 216.8 2,863.6 11.3 255.4 5,261.8
Industrial Catches: Main Species
Anchovies 1,094.3 67.0 69.3 64.9 1,295.5
Pacific mackerel 93.7 0.4 0.8 — 94.9
Horse mackerel 374.8 93.0 2,569.1 164.9 3,201.8
Chilean hake — 0.1 42.2 9.3 51.6
Tailed hake — — 70.4 0.5 70.9
Sardine 350.0 55.3 29.7 6.8 441.8
Pacific herring — — 79.6 8.0 87.6
Others 1.9 1.0 2.5 12.3 17.7
Source: SERNAP (1993).
Notes: Units are in thousands of metric tons. The table excludes algae, molluscs, and crustaceans. It also
excludes factory boats’ catches (60,100 tons in 1993). Factory boats mainly operate outside Chile’s ex-
clusive fishing zone (near the Austral fishing grounds).
a Includes seventy-three different fish species; A: regions I and II; B: regions III and IV; VIII: 8th re-
gion; Austral: regions X, XI, and XII; Chile is divided into twelve different administrative regions.
This paper adds to previous related studies (Gómez-Lobo and Jiles 1991, 1992;
Vial 1991; Peña and Nuñez 1994) a greater historical perspective and a stronger em-
phasis on the political economy underlying the legislation of the Chilean 1991 Fish-
eries Law. We examine hypotheses related to policy priorities, the organization of
regulatory actions, the regulator’s informational constraints, and the possibility of
regulatory capture. Although the evidence discussed cannot be interpreted as fully
conclusive, the facts and arguments exposed are consistent with the hypothesis of
regulatory capture.
The paper proceeds by first informing the reader about Chilean fishing grounds,
fish species, and industrial uses; then reviews the historical background of Chilean
fishing regulations and informs on the industrial structure of the most important
Chilean marine industrial fisheries. Afterwards, four complementary hypotheses are
proposed to explain the regulator’s weaknesses to enforce more binding access re-
strictions and catch quota regulations. Next, fishing controversies in the late 1980s
are described, and the political economy of the resulting legislative reform is ana-
lyzed. Concluding remarks are offered at the end.
Main Industrial Fishing Grounds
Marine biologists divide Chilean fishing grounds into four main geographical areas,
each of them distinguished by specific biological conditions (table 1). At present,
higher catches are concentrated in the southern VIIIth region and in the northern
zone A. Pelagic fish are predominant in both zones. Horse mackerels, anchovies, andPeña-Torres 256
sardines are the three most important species. Most pelagic catches are devoted to
fish meal production (table 2). Canning and frozen-fish industries are based mainly
on the processing of demersal fish species.
Since its origins as an industrial fishery in the mid 1950s, the northern pelagic
fishing grounds have been historically the most important industrial fisheries in
Chile. Between 1967–73 these fisheries became a de facto public monopoly, as the
result of a public takeover of the ownership and managerial control of the most im-
portant firms in this industry. This was the consequence of a policy of massive sub-
sidized public credit which was aimed at overcoming a widespread problem of bank-
ruptcy risks among private fishing firms triggered by a strong 1965 El Niño phenom-
enon (Peña 1996).
Between 1974–78 all the firms operating in this fishery were reprivatized.1 This
contributed to an increasing trend in the pelagic catches from northern zone A. This
trend peaked in 1986 (table 3).2 However, since the early 1990s this region has lost
its predominant position as the leading fishing ground. From 1982–83, the signifi-
cant and persistent harvesting at zone A contributed to a situation of biological
overexploitation of some of the main fish species caught in this zone (especially the
sardine stock, Barría and Serra 1989b).3
In contrast with the evolution of the northern pelagic catches, table 3 shows in-
creasing annual catches from the southern VIIIth region. Since 1981–82, a process
of significant entry to this fishery started.4 The expansion of the regional fleet and
processing capacity (mainly for fishmeal production) was led in its majority by local in-
cumbent firms and also, to a lesser extent, by newcomers into the fishing business.
Northern fishing firms did not participate massively in the investment expansion which
was occurring at the southern fishing grounds.5 In the late 1980s the main northern fish-
ing firms became engaged in a serious lobbying campaign to gain access to the (then
closed-entry) southern pelagic fisheries. As we explain later, this triggered distribu-
Table 2
Main Processing Fishing Industries (1993)
Northern Zone A VIIIth Region
Canned fish 23.2 127.8
Fish meal 1,932.1 2,764.3
Frozen fish 5.3 69.2
Others 4.3 1.3
Total use of raw fish 1,964.9 2,962.6
Source: SERNAP (1993).
Note: Units are in thousands of metric tons of processed raw fish.
1 This was parallel to a widespread reprivatization process (across productive sectors) which took place
in the Chilean economy in this period. As a consequence of the reprivatization of fishing firms, an in-
creasing pattern of private industrial concentration started to emerge in the northern pelagic fisheries.
2 Between 1978–86 a situation of open access to all pelagic fisheries prevailed. The number of industrial
boats in this zone increased from 116 in 1978 to 182 in 1986, while the fleet’s haul capacity increased
132%.
3 In this period there occurred another strong El Niño phenomenon (of similar strength to the one of the
early 1970s).
4 Between 1982 and 1993, the number of purse seine boats operating in the VIIIth region increased by
200%, while the fleet’s haul capacity increased nine times.
5 Along this period, the main northern fishing entrepreneurs were developing investment strategies
aimed at achieving a greater sectoral diversification, in order to improve their portfolio risk profiles.Chilean Fishing Regulation 257
tive disputes between northern and southern fishing firms which heavily shaped the
results from regulatory reform proposals discussed at the end of the 1980s.
Historical Regulatory Background6
The first Chilean Code of Civil Laws (1855) defined fishing rights for those who
first initiated the resource depletion (rights of occupation). Additional access restric-
tions were considered in terms of the fishermen’s nationality and the territorial area
under exploitation. The first specific Fisheries Laws (1929 and 1931) retained this
doctrine of historical rights.
In 1956 permits for fishing operations became required. This was pure access
regulation. Since the early 1960s [Law Decrees 597 (1960) and 524 (1964)] fishing
authorities intended to link the issue of new permits to the compliance with objec-
tives of total allowable catches (TACs). However, during this period proposals on
TACs were clearly more of a signal to the private sector, rather than enforceable
quota policies. During the 1960s the dominant policy aims were promoting the in-
dustrial development of marine fisheries and improving information on fish popula-
tions. Hence, the main regulation during this period was entry restriction via fishing
permit applications. This regulatory scheme prevailed until the mid 1970s.
In the mid 1970s there was a wave of criticism against the doctrine of historical
rights, which still dominated the issue of fishing permits. The main criticism7 was
that this type of regulation prevented competition between potential investors, mo-
nopolizing the resources to the benefit of those already established. This criticism
arose in parallel to the rapid growth of the Chilean fishing sector from the mid
1970s until the late 1980s. As an outcome of these ideas, the Law Decree (L.D.)
2442 (1978) led to free access. This implied that all applications for fishing permits
Table 3
Industrial Pelagic Catch
Annual Averages, Northern Southern












Source: Records from IFOP (Development Fisheries Institute) and pri-
vate sector firms.
Note: Units are in thousands of metric tons.
6 This section builds upon the pioneering effort of Montt (1985).
7 This was led by a group of economists who was in control of the government bureaucracy. Most of
them had postgraduate training at the Chicago School of Economics and from this feature they started to
be known as the “Chicago boys.”Peña-Torres 258
8 Until then, fishing regulations were under the rule of the Ministry of Agriculture. Under this scheme
fishing matters were secondary with respect to agricultural issues, and the ruling of fishing regulations
was dispersed among several civil service bureaucrats.
9 Each fishing boat had the legal obligation to regularly report on the catches of each fishing trip. The
Chilean Navy and the local police were in charge of random monitoring on boats and landing ports.
10 These courts only have jurisdiction over minor local legal violations (e.g., speeding violations of the
traffic law). This is an indication of the low priority which was assigned to fishing regulations.
(from resident fishermen) should be accepted, if minimum technical requirements
were fulfilled. This policy was consistent with the government’s political priority to
promote economic growth of recently reprivatized industries (including the fishing
sector) as a way to consolidate widespread reprivatization that took place in the
Chilean economy between 1975–82.
The L.D. 2442 centralized the responsibility of fishing regulations in a recently
created public regulatory agency (SUBPESCA),8 which was vested with independent
powers in most of the fishing regulation decisions. In 1978 the National Fishing Ser-
vice (SERNAP) was also created. Its objectives were to centralize the public sector’s
statistical records of fishing activities, monitoring and controlling fulfillment of the
prevailing fishing regulations,9 and prosecuting violations. Jurisdiction over these
prosecutions came under local police courts.10 These courts had the right to fine vio-
lators, but the law did not specify an explicit methodology to calculate these fines.
Hence, local judges had significant discretion over the determination of fine values.
In the main Chilean fishing grounds, free access prevailed until 1986. The rec-
ommended, but nonenforceable, global catch quotas were always exceeded. The de
facto ineffectiveness of dispersed fishing regulations was reinforced by a regulation
issued in 1980 (L.D. 175) which omitted any explicit mention of global quotas and
did not specify a clear commitment to a free access principle. This decree retained
SUBPESCA’s Director’s right to issue fishing permits, but it did not specify explicit
conditions for the granting of fishing permits.
During the 1980s most of the regulatory decisions continued to be taken on a
case-by-case basis. Different regulatory instruments (e.g., fishing moratoria, mini-
mum catch sizes) tended to be irregular in application (some restrictions replacing
earlier ones, then to be revoked and again replaced by earlier regulations). As a re-
sult, regulatory authorities’ objectives appeared to be ambiguous and ad hoc. How-
ever, there were also some improvements in fishing regulation.
Since 1980–81 regulatory agencies started to use more technically qualified
staff. This was parallel to a period of modernization within the whole civil service
sector. Concurrently, there began a regular calculation of annual scientific stock as-
sessments for the main fish species populations. This helped to formalize the idea of
permissible global annual catches. Since 1982 annual global quotas were used and
enforced in demersal fisheries (hake and whiting fisheries) located in southern fish-
ing grounds. New regulatory instruments became available, such as minimum catch
sizes, in 1981 (L.D. 458).
From 1982–83, however, there began an increasing conflict between regulators
and private firms over which instruments were more appropriate in regulating ma-
rine industrial fisheries. This controversy was related to the increasing scarcity of
important fish stocks, particularly of pelagic species in the northern fishing grounds,
that had been heavily harvested since the mid 1970s. From that time, the northern
pelagic fisheries became the most contentious fisheries to be regulated. The conflict
was reinforced by the lobbying powers that stemmed from the high concentra-
tion and large size of the dominant firms operating in these fisheries (section
IV). The absence of consensus on regulatory methods led to the increasing use
of biological seasonal closures as the main method to regulate fishing effort.Chilean Fishing Regulation 259
11 L.D. 160 (1983) was the first to define seasonal closures for sardine catches in the northern zone A.
After 1985 there were regular seasonal closures each year.
12 Also, to a lesser extent, in the northern horse mackerel stock.
13 Duhart and Weistein (1988), and SUBPESCA-CORFO (1989) are introductory analyses.
14 The Chilean fishmeal industry exports no less than 95% of its production.
Table 4
Recommended Versus Effective Catches: Northern Zone A
Horse Mackerel Sardine Anchovy
RTAC EC RTAC EC RTACf ECg
1987 na 279.9 1,400.0c 1,782.4 na 202.0
1988 89.4a 278.7 304.0d 1,356.0 50.0 806.0
1989 208.7a 265.8 333.0d 1,405.1 768.8 1,331.2
1990 na 258.2 na 700.4 na 599.7
1991 152 282.8 183 583.3 na 595.9
1992 103.3b 285.4 35.0e 631.7 na 982.1
1993 na 359.9 157 312.6 639 1,094.3
Sources: a Barría and Serra 1989a; b Barría and Serra 1991; c CORFO-IFOP 1987, AP 87/6; d Barría and
Serra 1989b; e Barría and Serra 1991a; f IFOP 1989; g Barría and Serra 1991b.
Notes: Units are in thousands of metric tons. RTAC: Fishing authorities’ recommended TAC; EC: Effec-
tive (industrial fleet) catches; na: not available to the author.
Seasonal closures were perceived as a more consensual instrument of regulation.11
Between 1982 and 1986 total industrial pelagic catches increased steadily. The
fisheries regulatory authorities wanted (without succeeding) to reduce total harvest-
ing, particularly at the northern pelagic grounds. The first (and probably the only)
serious attempt to enforce TACs at northern pelagic fisheries (L.D. 460, October
1981) was unsuccessful; this decree proposed an annual quota of 1.3 million tons for
sardine catches in zone A. Northern entrepreneurs then made lobbying efforts to in-
crease this quota. As a result, a second L.D. (263, September 1982) increased the
annual quota to 1.4 million tons. At the end of 1982, sardine catches in northern re-
gion A were 1.8 million tons. Not one transgressor was penalized.
As a consequence of the unsuccessful regulatory controls in the northern pelagic
fisheries (table 4), a policy of closed entry was implemented. Since 1986 (L.D. 436)
until 1991, the fleet’s haul capacity in the main industrial (pelagic) fisheries was fro-
zen at its 1985 level. This was the regulator’s response to a significant fall in the
stock levels of the main species under exploitation, especially in the northern sar-
dine stocks since 1981–82.12 Again during the 1980s global annual catch quotas
were recommended, yet again, they lacked enforceable power.
Industrial Concentration in the Chilean Pelagic Fisheries
Very little statistical information is available on the industrial structure of Chilean
marine fisheries.13 We have been able to aggregate firm level information on produc-
tion series that support the existence of industrial concentration in the pelagic fisher-
ies in the northern zone A and the southern VIIIth region.
In the latter, the ten biggest fishmeal processing firms produced nearly 80% of
the regional exports of this product during 1992.14 On average, each of them directly
owned fishing boats that supplied 60% of their raw fish needs (Peña 1996). We do notPeña-Torres 260
15 IFOP’s 1993 report confirms that until 1982 the size of the fleet operating in the VIIIth region was
quite stable, and that only since then a significant growth period started.
16 Despite their equity connections, each firm has its own managerial staff with independent decision-
making powers in most operational areas.
17 The recovery of Angelini group’s share in 1985 is due to its takeover of a big harvesting firm
(Guanaye); until that year, an independent rival firm is accounted for by the subgroup Others.
Figure 1.  Percent Shares in Industry’s Total Catch
(main firms, northern zone A; source: Peña 1996)
have information on the temporal evolution that preceded the current situation of indus-
trial concentration in the southern pelagic fisheries, but regional harvesting trends in
table 3 lead us to conjecture that this concentration phenomenon is probably a result of
the recent expansion period that has occurred in these fishing grounds.15
We have more detailed information about industrial concentration in the north-
ern zone A. It started with the reprivatization of the northern industry in the mid
1970s. Hence, concentration in the north is an older phenomenon than in the south.
The level of industrial concentration in the north is also higher than in the south.
Figure 1 shows the main fishing firms’ share in zone A’s total annual catches.
The Angelini group is a conglomerate of several firms, with vertically integrated
harvesting and processing operations, all of which are equity controlled by a single
owner.16 This conglomerate was consolidated during the 1974–78 reprivatization pe-
riod. Since the mid 1980s, it has represented around 55–65% of the northern total
harvest.17 Coloso is the second largest vertically integrated fishing firm in theChilean Fishing Regulation 261
18 In 1993 Coloso owned 28 industrial vessels operating in zone A, while the Angelini group had equity
control over 87 vessels. The regional industrial fleet in 1993 consisted of 157 boats (IFOP’s statistics).
19 Only a few of these smaller firms own processing plants. The rest of them supply their production to
the vertically integrated firms, frequently under exclusive ties or long-run contracting.
Figure 2.  Pelagic Industrial Catches
(main firms, northern zone A; source: Peña 1996)
north,18 accounting for a quite stable share (around 20%) of the northern catches in
the last two decades. The subgroup Others accounts for small industrial harvesting
firms:19 during 1988 it consisted of forty small firms, while in 1993 this number was
reduced to twenty-four (Peña 1996).
Figure 2 shows the catch performances from the main individual harvesting
firms. Coloso and Guanaye are the biggest individual firms. Guanaye has been part
of the Angelini group since 1985. The next two biggest firms under the Angelini
group’s control are Eperva and Indo. All these firms show strong vertical integration
between processing and harvesting operations. The positive correlation among these
firm’s catches is mainly due to common random shocks from nature and an homoge-
neous ex post search performance for fish patches’ location. Although bigger firms
can detect fish patches more quickly, the location of important fish patches quickly
becomes common knowledge. This is not only valid for boats belonging to the same
firm, but also for competing firms’ boats. In the case of migratory pelagic fish
patches, Peña, Basch, and Dufey (1996) show statistical evidence supporting the hy-
pothesis of external economies of scale in searching efforts.Peña-Torres 262
The presence of a small number of firms, with positively correlated catches, ac-
counting for a significant proportion of this fishery’s total harvests, leads us to an-
ticipate the presence of an organized interest group willing to invest in lobbying activi-
ties aimed at opposing catch quota proposals that could negatively affect the incumbent
firms’ harvesting. The strength of these firms’ lobby potential can be assessed vis à vis
the economic importance of the Angelini group: in 1992, it was the biggest economic
conglomerate in Chile, with diversified equity rights in several industries (fishing, for-
estry, energy, insurance services, retailing, and in other industrial subsectors). Angelini
group’s 1992 operational sales accounted for US$2.1 billion (nominal; Paredes and
Sanchez 1994). This corresponds to 20% of Chilean total exports in 1992.20 The eco-
nomic and political importance of the Angelini group within the Chilean economy is
therefore clear. Its importance goes well beyond the fishing industry.
Hypotheses on Enforcement Efforts
Government’s Policy Priorities
It seems clear that catch quota objectives have been dominated, during most of the
period since the mid 1960s, by objectives with higher political priority. During the
1960s the main fishing policy priorities were to promote industrial development and
to acquire scientific knowledge on fish stocks (SUBPESCA-CORFO 1989). On
some occasions conservation strategies were promoted by marine biologists and fishing
technicians working in regulatory agencies. Most of the time these strategies did not ob-
tain enough political support to overcome private sector opposition. This is consis-
tent with the predominant view at the time of fish stocks as abundant resources.
During the 1970s Chile faced profound economic changes. A widespread pro-
gram of liberal pro-market reforms was implemented. This implied a widespread
process of reprivatization, including the fishing sector, and a significant reduction in
the state’s direct regulatory role. For the political hierarchy in control of the government
bureaucracy, the dominant economic priorities were to consolidate, through accelerated
economic growth, the reprivatization program and the reduction of the state’s inter-
vention in economic matters (Paredes 1995). During this period, fish stocks were
still widely perceived as an abundant resource. This reduced the perceived urgency
to regulate the exploitation of these common pool resources. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that fishing authorities did not enforce restrictive catch policies.
During the 1980s resource conservation concerns became more widely shared
among public and private interest groups in Chile. Fish stocks started to be increas-
ingly perceived as scarce resources. During the early and mid 1980s, the political group
in control of the government bureaucracy gave preference to the general principle of
avoiding direct (catch) regulations, as those proposed by marine biologists and fishing
technicians in response to the declining northern pelagic fish stocks (Montt 1985;
Duhart and Weistein 1988). Toward the end of the decade, a more market-oriented
policy with transferable individual catch quotas began to be discussed.
Institutional Organization
When several regulatory agencies are involved in regulating an industry, conflict can
arise from the ambiguous allocations of residual rights of control over the regulatory
20 Exports in that year accounted for nearly 28% of the Chilean GDP.Chilean Fishing Regulation 263
decision-making process. Conflicts of this type tend to occur, ceteris paribus, the
lower the priority assigned by the political principal(s) to these decisions. In the
Chilean case, problems of this type seem to have occurred between the three public
sector institutions directly involved in fishing regulatory tasks.
SUBPESCA is the executive and resolutive regulatory agency. SERNAP is in
charge of information accounting, monitoring, and enforcement tasks. IFOP (Devel-
opment Fisheries Institute) is responsible for providing the scientific information re-
quired by SUBPESCA’s decision-making process.
SERNAP and IFOP are formally subordinate to SUBPESCA, but the latter has
no direct control over their budgets. The Director of SUBPESCA is responsible to
the Minister of Economics. The latter is also the principal of the Director of
SERNAP. On occasions, this has triggered conflict between SUBPESCA and
SERNAP. Budget disputes, and conflicts over decision-making pre-eminence, have
also occurred between SUBPESCA and IFOP.21 These disputes seem to have been
triggered by significant budget reductions faced by both institutions during the late
1970s and early 1980s, as part of the government’s strategies aimed at reducing the
state’s economic role in Chile.
Conflicts between regulatory agencies might have contributed to the inability of
Chilean fishing regulators to enforce more restrictive catch regulations. If true, this
would be a consequence of policy priorities. However, competition and conflict be-
tween regulatory agencies can also fulfill efficiency enhancing functions in a sec-
ond-best world. For instance, as a mechanism designed to extract information from
regulatory agencies endowed with private information and discretionary powers
(Laffont and Tirole 1993). This could be an efficiency enhancing function if, for ex-
ample, it were able to reduce the risk of regulatory capture from vested interests.22
Case-specific evidence would be needed to assess the relevance of these ideas.
Information Problems and Distributional Conflicts
On many occasions private fishing firms argued that regulators did not have enough
scientific information on the behavior of the fish stocks under exploitation to formu-
late an objective and efficient regulation based on annual catch policies. This lack of
information, they argued, would probably produce arbitrariness and distortions in
the definition of catch quotas.
If a justification for fishing regulations was accepted, incumbent firms usually
favored more direct controls over fishing effort, such as entry restrictions,23 as well
as fishing moratoria and technological restrictions over input uses (e.g., fishing
nets). Most of these regulatory measures would probably have produced smaller re-
ductions in incumbent firms’ profits, when compared with catch quotas.
The “lack of information” argument seems to have had a relatively sound basis,
at least until the beginning of the 1980s. However, since 1980–81 a process of sys-
tematic fish stock assessments was started, using Virtual Population Analysis (VPA)
(Gulland 1988). The quality of the information gathering process upon the catches’
age composition, on which this stock assessment methodology is based, steadily im-
21 Verbal opinions obtained from experienced fishing experts in the functioning of the Chilean public
sector fishing institutions.
22 Regulatory capture is feasible because of the existence of private information in the hands of particu-
lar regulatory agents. If role overlapping (and the triggered patterns of competition) between different
regulatory agencies helped change private information into common knowledge, then organized vested
interests would find it harder to capture the regulatory decision-making process.
23 This is compatible with the well-known proposition in economic theory that access restrictions are
beneficial regulations for incumbent firms (Stigler 1971; Kahn 1988, II:1).Peña-Torres 264
24 VPA methods, unless they are tuned to some index of stock abundance, are uncertain for the most re-
cent years in the stock assessment exercise. Hence, this is an important and valid concern. I thank John
Beddington for drawing my attention to this point.
25 For example, in the northern pelagic fisheries during the second half of the 1980s (“good” fishing
years, implying average productivity ratios—boat’s annual catches to its haul capacity—of around
sixty), the replacement cost of a modal size boat (350 tons) was around $US3 million. Given prevailing
fish meal prices, a vertically integrated harvesting/processing firm was expected to payback this invest-
ment cost in around four years, if we exclude depreciation allowances (which implies, essentially, to al-
low for the recovery of just the scrap value from the sunk capital); allowing for depreciation allowances,
the expected payback period was fourteen years (which would imply a full recovery of the initial sunk
capital, plus the profit flows during the in between period). The economic life of this type of boat fluctu-
ates between 30–40 years (from interviews with managers of private fishing firms).
proved. Despite the methodological improvements in the official (IFOP’s) fish stock
assessments, private fishing firms argued that there still persisted a significant un-
certainty in these estimations.24 Hence, the incumbent firms’ criticisms on the use of
quota policies persisted in the 1980s.
The incompleteness of available scientific information on fluctuating pelagic
fish stocks is still a controversial issue in Chile, and it will most probably remain as
such for a considerable time. However, it is clear that incomplete information alone
cannot explain the private firms’ persistent criticism of quota policy proposals. Dis-
tributional conflicts, derived from the existence of common property, play a key role
in understanding the private sector’s opposition to quota policies.
If the only problem were “lack of information,” then one should observe, as
time goes by, increasing investment in scientific knowledge from fishermen them-
selves, as this would help them to arrive at a more efficient cooperative collective
harvesting. A more complete scientific knowledge would help to reduce the uncer-
tainties faced by private entrepreneurs, thereby also helping them to reduce sunk
costs (excess capacity) related to the cyclical character of many marine fisheries.
However, we do not see much of this type of private investment in real world fisher-
ies. Scott (1993) offers a convincing argument related to this issue. He pinpoints
“uncertainties on distributional burdens” as a key barrier for agreeing on rules for
dividing the burdens of creating services with public-good features in common pool
fisheries.
Investment in scientific knowledge has public good features: the exclusive ap-
propriation of the possible benefits is by no means assured to the private investor. If
research were to result in useful new knowledge, it is probable that the latter would
quickly become common knowledge. Hence, each fisherman has an incentive to free
ride on others’ efforts for creating better information. In the case of pelagic fisher-
ies, one should add the short period that is often required for paying back invest-
ments that quickly become sunk capital.25 “Relatively quick” profits contribute to re-
duce the private incentives to invest in information about the future behavior of the
common pool resource. As a result, a vicious circle of information problems arises.
Because of common property, relatively quick profits, and significant uncertainties
on fish stocks’ characteristics, fishermen find it costly to agree on a formula for di-
viding the expenses of creating public (common) information. The private incentive
to underinvest in scientific knowledge helps to perpetuate the uncertainties faced
and, thereby, the high costs for agreeing on a distributional formula for the group to
tax itself so as to finance the required public goods.
So far the argument looks like a direct justification for government’s investment
in scientific knowledge related to fishery management. However, even if the funding
and efficient organization of this task were solved, bargaining costs related to uncer-
tain distributional impacts would remain significant. Better scientific information
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complete and asymmetric private information sets remain widespread. Better scien-
tific information may imply more stringent restrictions on incumbents’ future fishing
efforts. Even if this were expected to produce higher future aggregate catches, indi-
vidual incumbents would probably discount on this option value, given the presence
of common property and uncertain states of nature. Hence, significant costs for
agreeing on the “distribution of burdens” from restrictions on current fishing efforts
would still be present. We should probably expect lobbying efforts from interest
groups aimed at reducing unfavorable effects to each group. Lobbying pressures
from competing interest groups may finally result in the capture of the regulation
(Stigler 1971).
Regulatory Capture?
“Economists’ surveys of fishery regulation make much of the power of govern-
ment action to remedy the wastes of common property and similar market fail-
ures. But I do not believe that an increase in efficiency in resource allocation
very often enters into politicians’ motivation for intervening in the fishery, or
in any other sector… Political support would be given to restrictions on the
overapplication of inputs if… they would work to the advantage of incumbent
fishermen.” (Scott 1979, pp. 729–30)
Scott (1979) illustrates the so called “capture” or “interest group” theory that
emphasizes the role of interest groups in the formation of public policy. Under this
paradigm, economic regulations are understood as often being motivated or con-
trolled by the private interests to be regulated. This is in contrast with the so-called
public interest theory that emphasizes the government’s role in correcting market
imperfections, where regulators are viewed as benevolent maximizers of social wel-
fare.
In interest group theory, regulatory agencies are usually analyzed as facing in-
centives to identify with specific interest groups. Sometimes these agencies (or their
political principals) can behave as simple arbitrators among competing private inter-
ests (Peltzman 1976). On occasions they can be captured by the private parties’ in-
terests under regulation (Olson 1965; Stigler 1971). The common insight is that
regulatory outcomes are not independent of the lobbying powers of private groups.
The principal-agent relationships that arise from these multiple-tiered power interac-
tions, and the private stakes that they involve, have their origins in the existence of
informational asymmetries. The latter explain why regulators can have discretion
and why interest groups have power and stakes (Laffont and Tirole 1993, ch. 11).
The inability of Chilean fishing regulators to enforce catch quotas in the north-
ern pelagic fishing grounds, specially since the early 1980s, is consistent with “cap-
ture” arguments. Three important facts are compatible with this type of hypothesis:
(i) distributive conflicts (against northern entrepreneurs’ interests) triggered by at-
tempts to regulate pelagic catches in the late 1980s, and the resulting incentives to
capture the regulatory reform process; (ii) economic power, and hence the potential
for lobbying action, of the dominant incumbent firms that have operated in the
northern fishery for at least two decades; and (iii) resulting ad hoc restrictions on
the scope of use of important regulatory instruments. Triggered by an attempt to
modernize a fifty-year old fisheries law, the Chilean controversies on fishing regula-
tion in the late 1980s constitute an interesting case study to analyze the relevance of
information problems, distributional conflicts, and interest groups’ pressures to in-
fluence government’s actions in fishery regulation.Peña-Torres 266
Late 1980s Reform of Chilean Fisheries Regulation
In December 1989 the soon-to-end Pinochet government enacted a new fisheries law
(the Merino Law).26 Its implementation was intended to become effective March
1990. A few days before this deadline, the democratically elected, Aylwin govern-
ment postponed the implementation of the new law until October 1990, on the basis
of a commitment to review the structure of this law. This triggered a protracted dis-
cussion on the regulation of fisheries until September 1991, after six deferrals in
Congress to deal with the proposed bill of reforms.
Original Proposal (the Merino Law) and the Transition Process
The Merino Law defined two types of fisheries: those in a stage of full exploitation,
and the remaining ones. A fishery is said to be in a stage of full exploitation if ex-
ploitation is high enough to offset the surplus productivity of the species.27 In the
late 1980s, the northern and southern pelagic fisheries were in a stage of full exploi-
tation. These had been the most heavily exploited fishing grounds during the last de-
cade and, accordingly, they were the fisheries that most urgently required changes in
their regulation.
Access to fisheries, other than those in full exploitation, was to be free.28 This
implied no change in access regulation for these fisheries. The crucial innovation in
access regulation was related to full exploitation fisheries. Until then, access to fish-
eries in this stage was closed by a freezing policy on the industrial fleet’s haul ca-
pacity. The Merino Law proposed that access to these fisheries be regulated by a
system of individual, permanent, and marketable licenses for fishing that would be
freely transferable and divisible. These were to be based on Individual Transferable
Quotas (ITQs) which were defined as a percentage of the annual global quotas. The
global quota was defined for a fishery unit which consisted of a particular fish spe-
cies and a given fishing region. The transferable individual licenses gave the right to
catch a specific weight (tonnage) of fish.
The initial allocation of ITQs was to be a function of the individual firms’ per-
centage share of total catches in the three previous years to the implementation of
the new law. This system of historical-rights allocation was attacked vigorously by
the incumbent firms operating at the northern fishing grounds. This allocation sys-
tem ruled out the access of newcomers to a given fishing region, unless they were
willing to buy fishing rights from incumbent firms. This represented a significant
cost for the incumbent firms operating in the overexploited northern fishing
grounds, because in the late 1980s they were planning to redirect part of their fish-
ing efforts toward the more abundant southern fish stocks. Alternative proposals,
none of them finally accepted, allowed some percentage of initial participation for
new investors through a public auctioning of part of the global quota. The incumbent
26 This name stems from the surname of the Commander-in-chief of the Chilean Navy who initially pro-
moted the enactment of a new fisheries law.
27 The surplus productivity of a given fish stock is measured as the difference between recruitment and
natural mortality. If economic exploitation equates or overcomes the surplus productivity of a given fish
species, its population remains constant or decreases, respectively. The initial fish stock level is irrel-
evant for this definition. This is an odd feature. Presumably, the underlying idea consisted of defining a
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) condition. A possible justification for the underlying ambiguity in
the formal definition of the full exploitation status could be that it allows the regulator to define in a
more flexible way the precise meaning of MSY, for a given fish population. I thank marine biologist A.
Zuleta for suggesting to me this interpretation.
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firms operating at the northern fishing grounds decided to lobby for free access to
the more abundant southern fishing grounds.
Whereas the northern entrepreneurs opposed the use of ITQs and other forms of
access regulation, southern incumbent entrepreneurs, who had weaker lobbying
powers versus their northern counterparts, were clearly more sympathetic to the ITQ
proposal. The latter favored the southern incumbents because it helped them to re-
duce the competitive pressures arising from the northern entrepreneurs’ desire to re-
allocate part of their fishing effort towards the southern fishing grounds.
Fishing workers’ unions also opposed the Merino Law, although their lobbying
powers had been significantly reduced as a consequence of pro-competition labor re-
forms which had been implemented since the late 1970s by the military government.
Fishing workers’ unions argued that the Merino Law implied a “privatization” of the
sea, which they opposed. They feared that this new law could imply higher unem-
ployment because of entry restrictions and lower catches in the near future.
In terms of institutional organization, the Merino Law created a National Fisher-
ies Council which was vested with consultative powers, while the traditional fishing
regulatory authorities (SUBPESCA and SERNAP) retained policy-making and en-
forcing powers respectively.29
The Transition Process
One of the first actions of Aylwin government was a proposal to defer and modify
the Merino Law. To avoid political conflicts that could damage the recently restored
democracy, the newly elected Aylwin government tried to achieve consensus in most
of the relevant political issues; the new fisheries law was one of them. In order to do
so, a National Fishing Commission was appointed with the task of proposing a new
bill of law.
The deferral of the Merino Law was publicly defended on the grounds that the
proposed free access regime for fisheries, other than those in a stage of full exploita-
tion, would imply significant overfishing. However, there was also an important im-
plicit argument underlying the new government’s decision to postpone the enactment
of this new law. The ongoing discussion had resulted in a widespread argument
about the constitutional validity of the state’s rights to limit access to fisheries and
to sell property rights over the use of fish stocks. The new government’s diagnosis
was that the enactment of the Merino Law could have challenged the authority’s ca-
pacity to enforce regulatory actions at industrial fisheries, as this issue had to be ad-
judicated by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal.30 This possibility
was perceived as a significant risk, given that ITQs were the key regulatory instru-
ment within the Merino Law. If ITQs were judged to be unconstitutional, the fisher-
ies regulator’s powers would then have been severely reduced. Both the Supreme
Court and the Constitutional Tribunal had a sensitive political relationship with the
new government. The possibility of a political bargaining on this issue was some-
thing that the new government wished to avoid. During this period any constitutional
controversy raised delicate issues, because a complex process of political transition
from a sixteen-year military dictatorship to a democratic system was taking place.
What differences did the Aylwin government’s proposal have with respect to the
Merino Law? First, access to all fisheries, excluding those under full exploitation,
29 Formed by representatives of different groups involved in the fishing sector (entrepreneurs, workers,
fishing experts, and civil servants). Membership was an ad honorem activity.
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31 Presumably, SUBPESCA’s approval would be more restrictive concerning access conditions than the
previously proposed registration requirement for harvesting at fisheries other than those under full ex-
ploitation.
32 Keen (1988) and Fletcher (1965) discuss this issue in the context of U.S. fisheries.
33 Especially those involved in the northern pelagic fishery. See the interview with F. Lamarca, one of
the top managers of the Angelini group (the dominant conglomerate in this fishery), El Mercurio (14
January 1990).
34 The cyclical substitution thesis is still controversial among marine biologists. It is possible to cite par-
tial evidence justifying this case for other fisheries around the world, but no definitive conclusion can
yet be drawn (Cushing 1988; Gulland 1988). For more recent information on this issue, see Csirke et al.
(1996).
35 In order to gain access to southern fish stocks, the northern entrepreneurs wanted to eliminate the fleet
(size) freezing regulation imposed by the military government since 1986. An additional way to bypass this
regulation consisted of installing new processing plants at the target region, and then defending the need for
an own fleet in order to successfully supply the required fresh raw fish. This tactic helped to increase the
regional fleet’s fishing capacity, despite the formal existence of a freezing policy on its level.
36 The distributive problem was certainly not publicly discussed or acknowledged by the private vested
interests.
would be allowed only with the prior approval of SUBPESCA.31 Second, the new pro-
posal included more instruments to regulate fisheries under full exploitation (limits on
the number of ships, other fishing effort regulations, global catch quotas, and ITQs allo-
cated completely via historical rights). Third, the enforcement capacity of the fishing au-
thorities was strengthened, their budgets were increased, and their rule-making pow-
ers were retained. This proposal also created one National and several Zonal Fisher-
ies Councils, designed to serve as institutions of discussion and consultation.
This proposal was again attacked by the northern entrepreneurs. In contrast,
southern entrepreneurs, artisanal fishermen, and fishing workers gave their support
to it. However, this was not enough to allow for the final enactment of this proposal.
The underlying conflicts fueled a protracted multiparty bargaining process, lasting
until September 1991. The controversies were related to four key points: (i)
Redistributional disputes about the initial allocation of the exclusive fishing rights,
in terms of who were eligible for them, with what proportions of the global quota,
and subject to what payment for these rights. (ii) Constitutional issues concerning
the state’s right to limit access to fisheries and to sell property rights to fish stocks.32
The key issue was what type of rights the state has and hence can transfer to private
agents over marine resources (Constitutional Report on the Fisheries Law, Decem-
ber 1990). (iii) Private entrepreneurs33 argued that an ITQs scheme had infeasible in-
formation requirements. They argued that regulators do not, and cannot, know the
information required to implement an efficient system of ITQs. This criticism was
mainly related to the costs of monitoring the true state of fish stocks and, with less
emphasis, individual firms’ harvesting. (iv) Northern entrepreneurs argued that there
was a cyclical substitution among the main species under exploitation in the north
(sardines and anchovies). They argued that when one of the species suffers a strong
depletion, affecting its basis of reproduction, another species will take up its posi-
tion in the ecosystem. Therefore, any reduction in a single stock will be counter-
acted by an increase in the competing species, allowing for continuity in fishing ac-
tivity. Moreover, it was argued that the depleted species will come back after awhile,
the recovery period depending on the species’ growth patterns and the firms’
multispecies harvesting strategies.34
Northern entrepreneurs succeeded in using arguments (ii), (iii), and (iv) to re-
duce the use of ITQs and access direct restrictions.35 Among the more openly dis-
cussed issues under controversy,36 the constitutional debate became the dominant
discussion. In October 1990, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that several articles of
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related only to minor legal procedural issues. The statement was a legal compro-
mise, designed to bypass, and therefore leave unresolved, the main issue of the
state’s rights to limit access and to sell property rights over fish stocks. As a result
of this ruling, the government was forced to seek a compromise agreement in order
to avoid further postponement of the law. By September 1991 a political agreement
was arrived at by the main political parties controlling Congress.
Political Agreement:  The 1991 Fisheries Law
This section discusses features of the 1991 Fisheries Law (L.D. 430, September
1991) which represent a significant change versus the previously existing fisheries
regulatory framework. Unless explicitly stated, the concepts and regulatory agencies
involved in this discussion correspond with those previously described.
Fisheries Categories and Access Regimes
This law maintains free access as the general principle. Access to fisheries in this
general regime requires SUBPESCA’s issuing of boat-specific fishing permits.
SUBPESCA’s decisions on fishing permits are required to be “well-founded,” and
subject to a previous technical report from SERNAP.
Apart from the already discussed full-exploitation regime, two other categories
for fisheries are created: (i) Under Recovery, which implies a fishery in a stage of
full exploitation and afterwards under at least three years of biological closure (just
before this new category starts to prevail); and (ii) Infant Development, that is, when
current exploitation in a given fishery is less than 10% of the regulator’s proposed
TAC for that fishery, but subject to entry-interest from a “considerable number of
potential entrants.”
Entry restrictions are possible in the three special fisheries regimes (under re-
covery, infant development, and full exploitation). Table 5 summarizes the main le-
gal requirements for declaring the status of each fishery, the nature of the corre-
sponding access regulations, and the main requirements for legal approval of other
key regulatory decision areas.
In the case of the Under Recovery and Infant Development categories, closed
entry is tantamount to the validity of these categories. In the case of fisheries under
Full Exploitation, entry restrictions require specific approval, which is subject to a
more demanding majority condition than in the other two special fishery categories.
Entry restrictions under Full Exploitation status are also subject to an ad hoc transi-
tory nature: they have a time limit of one year, although SUBPESCA can propose a
new one-year extension of the entry restriction every year. These peculiar differ-
ences in the access restrictions applicable to each fisheries category are undoubtedly
compromising solutions to the strong lobbying pressures which surrounded the bar-
gaining of new regulations for those fishing grounds which were already under full
exploitation conditions (i.e., the northern and southern pelagic fisheries).
Use of ITQs
ITQs remain as a possible regulation, keeping the character of divisible, transferable
(only once a year), and leasable individual fishing rights, but their use is subject to
ad hoc restrictions. In the case of fisheries under full exploitation status, ITQs are
limited to a maximum of half the annual TAC; the other half of the global quota re-Peña-Torres 270
Table 5
Decision-Making Mechanisms in the 1991 Fisheries Law
Key Decision Areas Requirements for Legal Approval   Remarks
(I) Declaration of full - SUBPESCA’s technical report. - This declaration allows for the
 exploitation stage - Absolute majority (50% + 1) in    introduction of transitory access
  Zonal and National Fisheries    restrictions.
  Councils.
(I.a) Access - SUBPESCA’s technical report. - Access restrictions have a maximum
 restrictions - 2/3 members approval in Zonal   duration of one year. However, they
  and National Fisheries Councils.   can be extended each time by one
  more year.
(I.b) Return to - SUBPESCA’s technical report.
 the general (free) - Absolute majority in Zonal and
 access regime.   National Fisheries Councils.
(I.c) Global - SUBPESCA’s technical report. - If unexpected favorable natural
 annual quotas - Consultation with Zonal Fisheries   phenomena occur, it is possible to
 (TACs)   Councils   increase the global quota with the
- Absolute majority in National   approval of National Fisheries Council.
  Fisheries Council.
(I.d) ITQs - SUBPESCA’s technical report. - If ITQs are auctioned in a year,
- Absolute majority in Zonal and   access to  the fishery is closed that year.
  National Fisheries Councils.
(II) Declaration of - SUBPESCA’s technical report. - As long as this stage remains valid,
 under recovery - Consultation with Zonal Fisheries   closed access prevails. Hence, closed
 stage and ITQs *   Councils.   entry is tantamount to the declaration
- Absolute majority in National   of this stage.
  Fisheries Council. - During first year, 100% of the
  total annual quota can be auctioned.
  The corresponding ITQs last
  ten years, losing each year 10%
  of its value. From the second year,
  a 10% of the global quota is
  annually auctioned.
(III) Declaration of - SUBPESCA’s technical report. - As long as this stage remains valid,
 infant development - Consultation with Zonal Fisheries   closed access prevails. Hence, closed
 stage and ITQs *   Councils.   entry is tantamount to the declaration
- Absolute majority in National   of this stage.
  Fisheries Council. - Three-year fishing permits are
  initially given to fishermen already
  established. After that, ten-year
  fishing permits are allocated via
  public auctioning and historical
  presence: If there are no established
  fishermen, 100% of the annual quota
  is allocated via ITQs during the first
  auctioning. Otherwise, only 90% is
  auctioned, while the other 10% is
  allocated via historical rights.
- ITQs lose each year 10% of its value.
  From the second year, a 10% of the
  global quota is annually auctioned.
Source: 1991 Fisheries law.
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37 The 1993 TAC was 4,000 metric tons.
38 The same occurs with results from the ITQ-scheme used in the southern cod fishery. The first ITQ
auction in this fishery was also carried out in December 1992 for 100% of a TAC = 5,000 metric tons.
Eleven firms participated. The average price for an equivalent auctioned lot of 1%-ITQ-rights was ten
times the required minimum price. Since 1993 to 1996 annual auctions of 10% of the current TACs have
been carried out; in each of them, ten lots of 1%-ITQ-rights have been sold. The TAC for 1996 was
7,500 tons. In this year, the average (real terms) price for a lot of 1%-ITQ-rights was 60% of its price in
the 1992 auction. No further information is available to the author.
39 References on studies of the pros and the cons of ITQs can be found in Squires et al. (1996), OECD
(1997), Grafton (1996), Squires and Kirkley (1996), Matulich, Mittelhammer, and Reberte (1996), and
the different country-specific case studies in the special issue of Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries,
Vol. 6, 1996.
mains under annually renewable closed-entry conditions. Each year the government
can publicly auction ITQs that together cannot exceed 5% of the corresponding an-
nual TAC. Hence, the maximum possible proportion under ITQs, of a given TAC, is
at best achievable over a period of ten years. Each ITQ is defined as a specific per-
centage over current annual global quotas, whatever the level of the latter. ITQs de-
fine transitory fishing rights valid for a ten-year period. However, for the case of
fisheries in Under Recovery or Infant Development status there are no significant
upper limits to the use of ITQs, which are again allocated by public auction. Table 5
provides more information.
The law does not commit itself to a general procedure for carrying out the pub-
lic auction of ITQs. The only general principle explicitly stated is the promise to en-
sure “an adequate access to medium-size and smaller fishermen to the auctioned
ITQs.” The specific details of the auction procedure are left to be defined by fishery-
specific ITQ regulations. Up to now, ITQs have only been used in two relatively
small fisheries (both in Under Recovery status): the red shrimp fishery and the cod
fishery in the southern Golfo de Penas. As an example of the procedural auctioning
rules used, let us consider the case of the first and second public auctions of ITQs in
the red shrimp industrial fishery.
In the first public auction held in March 1992, 100% of the annual TAC was
sold in seventeen different lots. Each of the first six lots represented 10% of TAC,
each of the following six represented 5% of TAC, and the remaining five represented
2% of TAC. This division was justified on the grounds of facilitating an “adequate
access” to medium-size and smaller fishermen. Each auctioned lot implied ITQ
rights valid for ten years. The seventeen lots were auctioned in a sequential way,
subject to an ex ante identical minimum auction price. Incumbents and newcomers
could participate in the auction. An upper limit of 50% of the total auctioned ITQ
rights was imposed on the ITQ rights that a single person, either directly or by third-
party agents, could buy through the auction process.
In the second public auction held in December 1992, and in each of the follow-
ing auctions to be carried out in December of each year, 10% of the current annual
TAC37 was to be auctioned, divided in ten identical lots, each representing a 1%-
ITQ-right over the current annual TAC. This division was again aimed at facilitating
access to medium-size and smaller fishermen to the auctioning scheme. Other proce-
dural auctioning rules were identical to those in the first auction. Unfortunately, no
public evaluation of the results from this ITQ management scheme is available yet.38
In this paper there is no space for an exhaustive analysis of arguments for and
against the use of ITQs in marine fisheries. This is a complex issue, with several
fishery-specific dimensions.39 Our focus here is to understand the key reasons under-
lying the enacted ad hoc restrictions upon the use of ITQs. Our key proposition is
simple: these restrictions have no clear-cut technical justification. Hence, they prob-
ably reflect a compromise to the strong lobbying pressures that were triggered by
distributional disputes over the initial allocation of ITQ rights.Peña-Torres 272
40 Distributional equity effects would crucially depend on the system used for initially allocating ITQs
rights.
41 I thank Anthony Scott for suggesting this interesting point.
The restricted scope of use of ITQs at fisheries under full exploitation cannot be
justified technically:
(i) “Biomass information requirements” are identical for global quotas and
ITQs. Quota-definition problems derived from highly fluctuating fish stocks (e.g.,
pelagic species) are common to both regulatory instruments. If ITQs are defined as a
proportion of the TAC, then adjustments in the TAC (in light of new stock assess-
ments information) could—in both quota systems—reduce the overexploitation risks
which result from hard-to-predict stock fluctuations. If the latter is a significant fea-
ture of the fishery, ITQ-hoarding may reduce the Pareto-efficiency of the remaining
ITQ trading.40 However, with global quotas and hard-to-predict stock fluctuations,
other well-known Pareto-inefficiencies emerge (capital stuffing and rent-wasteful
racing harvesting behavior). In this type of fisheries, there seems to be no way to
assess, on an a priori “technical” basis, which of these two quota instruments may
imply greater Pareto-inefficiencies.
(ii) The argument that enforcement of ITQs could be very costly, to be effica-
cious, seems not to be a technically decisive issue, not if it is placed in relative
terms to the enforcement costs of annual global quotas. In the case of the main Chil-
ean industrial fisheries, the enforcement costs of ITQs should not be significantly
higher than those for enforcing annual TACs, because most of the production is ex-
ported and hence there is a complementary way (i.e., export statistics) to direct con-
trols on individual catches in enforcing ITQs (Gómez-Lobo and Jiles 1992).
Moreover, there is a more general argument which can favor the relative enforce-
ment cost position of an ITQ system: if ITQs were perceived as “well-defined” rights
(i.e., that the exclusive appropriation of the ITQ-embodied individual benefits is eco-
nomically feasible), then it would be quite plausible to expect a higher degree of quota
compliance in a system with ITQs than in one which uses only TACs. In the former,
fishermen should eventually internalize, when deciding about quota compliance, that
their own valuable property is at stake.41 Of course, the validity of this argument is
heavily dependent on the assertion “if ITQs were perceived as well-defined rights.”
In the Chilean hybrid ITQ system for fisheries under full exploitation status, in-
dividual fishing rights remain ambiguously defined: the law does not specify
whether ITQ owners have the right to harvest before firms under closed access con-
ditions, or whether both fishing schemes simultaneously compete in harvesting. The
closer the situation to simultaneous competition, the weaker the advantages of this
ITQ system, relative to common property, will tend to be.
As long as ITQ rights are perceived as ambiguously defined, ITQ owners will
tend to face incentives for some degree of wasteful racing behavior. These incentives
will be stronger, ceteris paribus, the shorter the temporal advantage ITQ owners
have over firms harvesting under closed access conditions; also, the more sensitive
harvesting costs are to changes in fish stock abundance; and, finally, the greater the
uncertainty prevailing with respect to changes in the annual TAC. The latter feature
is certainly a probable one in the case of pelagic fisheries, because of their highly
fluctuating behavior due to recruitment, migratory, and seasonal patterns.
(iii) Finally, there is no possible technical justification, on an a priori basis, for
the different scopes of use for ITQs that were finally enacted for fisheries under Full
Exploitation status versus those in Under Recovery or Infant Development catego-
ries. However, distributional effects fit nicely as a key underlying force triggering
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42 Munro and Scott (1985), Munro (1982), Charles (1988), Townsend (1990), Copes (1986) and the case
studies in Marine Resource Economics (Winter 1988), and the Journal of the Fisheries Research Board
of Canada (July 1979).
43 “Most management techniques have some advantages; but all have disadvantages; several will work
well when conditions are right, but none will work well under all conditions. It is therefore fruitless to
look for the perfect technique.” (Gulland 1989, p. 270)
ers only existed in fisheries under full exploitation status (i.e., the northern main in-
cumbent firms). The prospect of losses, triggered by the use of payment schemes to
enjoy private fishing rights, was clearly more threatening for incumbent firms in the
overexploited northern pelagic fishing grounds than for incumbents in the other
main Chilean fisheries at the time of the law reform.
The proposition that ad hoc restrictions imposed upon ITQs’ scope of use are
the result of “regulatory capture” is consistent with the fact that ITQs have not been
used, up to now, in the most conflicting fisheries: the pelagic fishing grounds in the
northern zone A and the southern VIIIth region. Both fisheries are currently kept under
annually renewable closed entry regulation and subject to regular seasonal closures.
The above arguments help us to understand the recent Chilean failure in allocat-
ing individual fishing rights, based on historical presence, in fisheries subject to sig-
nificant harvesting pressure. This experience could be initially interpreted as weak-
ening the advocatory literature which suggests allocation based on historical-rights
as a plausible solution for the distributional disputes triggered by the initial alloca-
tion of property rights (e.g., Libecap 1989; Cropper and Oates 1992). This proposal
is based on the attempt to reduce conflicts due to noncompensated expropriation of
sunk capital’s rents. In Chile, however, this was not the main source of distributive
conflict. The latter was mainly related to asymmetric exploitation levels in key ma-
rine (pelagic) fisheries and, hence, to significant differences in the expected eco-
nomic rents from each of them.
Other Regulatory Instruments
The new law retains annual global catch quotas and other biologically oriented con-
trols on fishing efforts (seasonal closures, minimum net, and catch sizes) as core in-
struments of control. Empirical evidence, nonetheless, has shown that these instru-
ments tend to be inefficient in solving overfishing problems.42 On the other hand, it
is also true that first-best regulation should usually be considered more as a bench-
mark than as a feasible policy in most real world problems; this is especially true in
already over-exploited common pool industrial fisheries.43 Taking into account prac-
tical ground restrictions, the degree of relative success with this type of regulatory
instrument depends closely on the regulator’s capacity to enforce them. Budgetary
decisions are a significant aspect of this issue. Since the enactment of this law, both
SERNAP’s and SUBPESCA’s budgets have increased in real terms. Nonetheless, the
enforcement productivity of these resources remains yet to be evaluated.
Monitoring, Penalties, and Sanctioning Courts
Beside budgetary issues, the new law offers scope for improvement in the implemen-
tation of enforcement actions. First, SERNAP’s monitoring tasks are supported by the
firms’ legal duty to register in a National Fishing Register, in which they have to report
technical aspects of their fleet. Each boat must inform on its catch in each fishing trip,
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44 For instance, the closure of processing plants, the appropriation of the tonnage caught and/or fishing
equipment, the caducity of boats’ fishing permits and fishermen’s individual fishing licenses.
45 There are five Zonal Fisheries Councils, each defined for a main fishing geographical region: one for
each of the northern regions A and B (table 1), one for the fishing region composed of administrative
regions V to IX, one for regions X and XI, and one for region XII and Antarctica. Each Zonal Council
has sixteen members: five are civil servants related to fisheries regulatory agencies and local
government’s administration, two are academic fishery experts, four are representatives of fishing entre-
preneurs’ local associations, another four are representatives of labor’s local associations, and one is a
representative of pro-environment groups. The civil servants, the academic experts, and the pro-environ-
ment representative are appointed as Council members by the President of Chile and cannot remain in
this post for more than four years. The National Fisheries Council has twenty members: four are repre-
sentatives of entrepreneurial organizations, four are from labor organizations, three are civil servants re-
lated to fisheries regulatory agencies, another is SUBPESCA’s Director, another is an executive secre-
tary who is nominated by SUBPESCA’s Director, and the other seven (professionals with fishing exper-
tise) are directly nominated by the President of Chile. The civil servants remain as Council members as
long as they keep their public sector post, while the others cannot remain as Council members for more
than four years.
46 A related interesting anecdote: a nontrivial dispute between private firms has recently occurred. The
dispute is related to the issuing of fishing permits in the profitable Austral hake fishery. One of the inter-
ested parties is an ex-SUBPESCA’s director (now a private entrepreneur) who has publicly described the
current National Fisheries Council as “a group of friends” attempting to argue against some presumed
unfairly biased Council’s decisions (Newspaper Estrategia, 4 January 1997). Among his arguments, the
ex-Director mentions that in the current National Council there are no representatives of private entre-
preneurs operating in the northern zone A and the southern region XII, both of which are very important
fishing zones in Chile.
the opportunity to change its traditional policing-type approach, placing more emphasis
on auditing, given the possibility of cross checking between boats’ catch reports and pro-
cessing plants’ production reports. However, refocusing enforcement efforts towards
more auditing would most likely require budgetary increases for SERNAP.
Second, violations of fishing regulations are now penalized, for the first time, by
clearly defined fines. The new fisheries law defines a range of nonmonetary penalties44
and graduated monetary fines for different types of transgressions. Monetary penalties
define fines as a proportion of the catch value: different proportional factors, according
to the infraction severity, are applied to “infraction values” which are defined by multi-
plying the catch tonnage under violation and the unit value (landing price) of the species
caught. The dependence of the level of the fine upon catch value provides more effi-
cient penalty incentives than fixed penalties (Stigler 1970; Posner 1986).
Third, legal jurisdiction over prosecution cases against violators of the fisheries
law rests with civil courts. They are more powerful tribunals than local police courts
which were previously in charge.
Fisheries Councils
The 1991 fisheries law maintains the National and Zonal Fisheries Councils origi-
nally proposed by the Aylwin government’s fisheries bill, but now they are vested
with resolutive powers in several of the most important regulatory issues (see details
in table 5). These Councils are composed of representatives of different interest
groups involved in the fishing sector.45 Hence, the new fisheries law gives partial
resolutive powers to private lobbies whose objectives may differ from social objec-
tives. These powers might strengthen these lobbies’ rent-seeking efforts. If this were
so, this institutional design would be compatible with the hypothesis of regulatory
capture. It is not obvious, however, that all private sector’s representatives would
necessarily collude against the fishing regulator. It is even possible that a wider pri-
vate participation in regulatory decisions would bring more credibility and institu-
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47 The law gives the character of public information to the minutes of the National and Zonal Councils’
sessions.
48 This covers vessels operating within the Chilean EEZ. Artisanal fishermen are exempt from this tax
payment.
49 During 1996, the total public expenditure in fisheries-related research was equivalent to $US6.1 mil-
lion. Nearly 80% of this research was financed by the FRF’s specific tax.
50 The FRC is presided by SUBPESCA’s Director who also nominates its executive secretary. Other
members are the President of the National Oceanographic Committee, and six fishery experts who are
nominated by the President of Chile.
A peculiar feature of this institutional design is the ad honorem character of the
Councils’ membership. If the Councils are designed to produce socially productive
rule-making, it seems odd that their activity is not monetarily rewarded. Although
information sharing is quite possibly a nonmonetary reward to Council membership,
and reputation effects could penalize Council members’ decisions which deviate
from social objectives (if these decisions were made public information),47 it is not
clear that the ad honorem scheme is the optimal mechanism to reduce the risk of
regulatory capture from vested interests, particularly if this scheme were to reduce
the accountability of Council members’ decisions. More precise comments would re-
quire empirical evidence on the rule-making process from the Fisheries Councils.
Fisheries Research Fund
The law creates, for the first time, a Fisheries Research Fund (FRF) for assisting the
fishing regulator’s management tasks. The FRF is financed by funds from the
government’s current annual budget and annual lump sum per boat taxes paid by op-
erating industrial fishing boats.48 The per vessel tax rate is calculated in a progres-
sive fashion: bigger vessels pay proportionally more per ton of haul capacity. These tax
rates are fixed by law (i.e., they cannot be changed at the fishing regulator’s own discre-
tion) as long as the resulting tax revenues are greater than the direct contribution from
the government’s current annual budget.49 FRF allocation to specific research
projects is decided by a Fisheries Research Council (FRC).50 Each year there is open
competition among researchers for the funds allocated to specific research projects.
This is a valuable new institutional instrument to improve knowledge of Chilean
fish stocks and fishery management. However, public evaluation of the efficiency of
the funding decisions taken by the FCR is not available yet. The FRF is subject to the
risk of capture by interest groups, including regulatory agencies. Public information on
the minutes of FRC’s sessions would be useful to reduce the risk of capture. It would
also help to establish a close match between regional tax burdens (i.e., the lump sum
tax on boats) and the regional benefits from the funded research on fisheries.
Concluding Remarks
We have studied the late 1980s reform of Chilean fisheries law. One of the key inno-
vations was aimed at implementing ITQs in the most important marine fisheries of
the country. However, distributional conflicts and triggered producers’ lobbying
strategies resulted in significant limitations on the scope of use for ITQs. This hap-
pened despite proposals to allocate initial ITQ rights on the basis of historical pres-
ence. Which particular features conditioned this result? Can any lesson be derived
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51 For example, when investment in sunk capital is able to be compensated by ITQ allocation based on
historical rights.
52 Gallick (1984) provides evidence for the U.S. tuna fishery (1950s and 1970s). Peña (1996) discusses
the case of the Peruvian anchovy fishery (mid 1960s to early 1970s).
53 This is a different claim from the more traditional proposition of monopsonistic or oligopsonistic
powers of processing firms with respect to competitive harvesting sectors (e.g., Crutchfield and
Pontecorvo 1969; Clark and Munro 1980).
Timing and Industrial Structure
The Chilean experience with ITQ legislation was shaped by the timing of reform,
the industrial structure of key marine fisheries, and the type of fish species ex-
ploited. Although reform proposals were initially discussed in the context of an au-
thoritarian political regime, reform of the law was finally carried out parallel to a
complex process of political transition from military dictatorship to democracy. This
certainly reduced the bargaining power of the political authority when facing the
need to decide on distributional conflicts involving politically powerful producers’
lobbies.
Part of the producers’ opposition to ITQs was due to incumbents’ fears of losing
quasi-rents stemming from the possession of sunk capital. This is a classical prob-
lem faced when initially allocating ITQs. To reduce opposition, allocation based on
historical presence is frequently prescribed. However, offering this option in Chile
was not enough to stop producers’ lobbying against ITQs. A key reason was the ex-
istence of significant differences in the expected rents in the main fisheries subject
to contentious enclosure. Northern pelagic grounds were increasingly perceived as
facing a serious “productivity crisis,” while southern pelagic grounds were experi-
encing a booming profit-promising expansion. Hence, the dominant incumbent firms
in the northern fishing grounds wanted to reallocate fishing efforts to the south; but
they did not have “historical rights” in this region to have claims on free-of-charge
ITQ rights. This was the essence of the key distributional conflict and the main
source of lobbying opposition to ITQs.
Therefore, an important basic tenant for success with ITQ introduction pro-
grams seems to be the authority’s ability to limit or sequentially separate them to
fishing grounds where either expropriation fears will not become a restriction that is
“too binding,”51 or entry pressures from new investors, or other sources of opposi-
tion to ITQs, can be diluted among asymmetric private interests of numerous and
heterogeneous fishermen.
The latter condition tends to be a frequent assumption in fishery economics. It is
indeed an implicit assumption in Scott’s apology (1993, pp. 194–95) for ITQs as ini-
tial providers of a ready-made exogenous distributional basis on which to sustain fu-
ture enhancements of fish stock management. However, industrial concentration, closed
entry conditions, long-established dominant firms, and/or asymmetric degrees of ex-
ploitation in the key fisheries subject to enclosure disputes, can all combine to trig-
ger costly-to-beat opposition to the introduction of ITQs. The Chilean case and other
available evidence suggest that industrial concentration at marine industrial fisheries
is not such an uncommon feature.52 A similar remark applies to vertical integration53
and restricted-entry conditions at current marine industrial fisheries.
Moreover, increasing industrial concentration at harvesting sectors could result
from reductions in harvesting productivity due to increasingly overexploited fish
stocks. One would expect the latter to require more intensive searching effort, and
perhaps also, better synchronization between harvesting and processing timings to
obtain higher-quality catches, a plausible demand from increasing competitive pres-
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54 The strength of this incentive depends on how stock-responsive marginal costs are (e.g., one would
expect a higher stock-responsiveness of marginal operational costs in fisheries where searching costs
play a more significant role). Of course, there are also a series of other factors which could fully coun-
teract this type of incentive, by increasing the costs of market reallocations toward higher industrial con-
centration (e.g., public subsidies to small-scale operation, small fishermen’s nonpecuniary benefits from
fishing activities, poor job alternatives because of low and nonmalleable human capital).
quirements. If true, the latter would imply, ceteris paribus, stronger incentives for
industrial concentration at harvesting sectors.54 This would make the organization of
collective action against ITQs less costly for fishermen. Market reallocations in this
direction would add to the importance of timing and sequencing issues of ITQ intro-
duction programs.
One might be tempted to argue that distributional conflicts are expected to be-
come more binding regulatory constraints for ITQ legislation in less developed
countries. However, this would imply that lower degrees of economic development
necessarily involve political institutions more permeable to pressure from vested in-
terests. There may be some truth in this assertion, but it is far from being a self-evi-
dent proposition. Rather than economic development by itself, the key issue here is
related to the functioning of political institutions which underlie the regulatory deci-
sion-making process.
Insufficient Information and State’s Incomplete Rights Over Marine
Common-Pool Resources
Controversies over these two issues were instrumental arguments used by incumbent
firms’ to lobby against ITQs. However, neither problem is specific to the Chilean
case. One can argue about differences of degree across countries, but not of nature.
Because large degrees of uncertainty will most likely persist for a long time in fish-
ing regulation worldwide, one should expect this type of argument to continue being
used by interest groups to sustain opposition to ITQ programs. Hence, reductions of
ambiguity on each of these issues would help regulatory efforts aimed at achieving
more efficient enclosures for the commons.
However, because of the public good features which are present in both issues,
improvements to each of them depend on similar political constraints (influence and
capture games) to those shaping the fate of specific regulatory instruments. Public
investment in scientific knowledge and further legislative precision on the state’s
rights over common-pool resources are indeed affected by lobbying actions from or-
ganized interest groups. Therefore, one would expect improvements in both areas to
follow, in general, slow and gradual progress. This certainly creates conflict with de-
mands of urgency from short-term policy making.
The related need for accumulating more specialized human capital, and the slow
and costly process that this often entails, further reinforces the potential conflict be-
tween investment needs and short-run decision making. It is more convincing to ar-
gue that this type of conflict will tend to produce more binding regulatory con-
straints the lower the prevailing degree of economic development. Indeed, this type
of conflict implies a complex challenge for institutional improvement and economic
progress. As a possible step forward, the new Chilean fisheries law has created an-
nual funding for research on fisheries. However, the existence of this fund is far
from guaranteeing successful and useful research. Looking beyond the Chilean ex-
perience, there seems to be a clear need for further research on the latter type of
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Type of Marine Species and ITQs’ Relative Advantages as Regulatory Instrument
Lastly, ITQs need not always be the optimal regulatory instrument. In the late 1980s
Chilean experience with ITQ legislation, there was an a priori tendency, especially
among economists playing an active role in promoting ITQs for regulating marine
fisheries, toward an almost unconditioned support for the use of ITQs without much
detailed discussion on the effects from different biological and technological fishery
settings.
However, recent analyses of accumulated experiences with ITQ regulation (e.g.,
Squires et al., 1996 and other references cited there), have started to characterize
conditions under which ITQs can more likely produce undesired results (e.g., high
discarding and highgrading due to imperfect targeting of individual species, and
negative spillovers to other fisheries). For instance, paraphrasing Squires, et al.
(1996, p. 29), multispecies fisheries with numerous but no dominant species (in-
creasing potential discarding and highgrading losses), with unstable and hard-to-pre-
dict recruitment and resource stocks (increasing the uncertainty on changes in global
quotas), with limited gear selectivity (reducing control on catch composition), and
with relatively high numbers of gear types (increasing potential conflicts among
fishermen), are expected to imply more serious challenges to the implementation of
effective ITQ programs. Further work on these lines is a fruitful research area.
Evaluations of additional experiences with ITQs should help produce more detailed
prescriptions for future policy design.
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